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This study investigated the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanism on audit pricing in the samples from 73 public listed companies in 
Nigeria over a two-year period. Many studies have been carried out in developed 
countries and some emerging countries on audit pricing. However, very little 
attention has been paid to countries in the sub-Saharan Africa. This study extended 
prior audit fees model by investigating the impact of board ethnic diversity, foreign 
directors and the two board sub-committees (i.e. risk management committee and 
corporate governance committee), introduced in the 2011 Nigerian code of corporate 
governance, on audit pricing. Data for this study was gathered through secondary 
source in the form of annual reports (observation= 124) from 23 sectors of Nigeria 
economy. The hypotheses were tested with panel data regression analysis. The 
results revealed that foreign directors, risk management committee and corporate 
governance committee positively and significantly influence audit pricing. However 
board ethnic diversity does not have significant relationship with audit pricing. This 
findings support both the agency and resource dependency theories. The policy 
implication of this finding is that weak corporate governance mechanisms and 
ownership structure influence audit pricing. Therefore, the quality of audit is affected 
as well. This necessitates the need for policy makers to promulgate policies that will 
monitor audit pricing in the country.  







Kajian ini mengkaji kesan struktur pemilikan dan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat 
pada harga audit bagi sampel 73 syarikat awam tersenarai di Nigeria bagi tempoh 
dua tahun. Banyak kajian berkenaan yuran audit telah dijalankan di negara-negara 
maju dan beberapa negara-negara membangun. Walau bagaimanapun, perhatian 
yang sangat sedikit telah diberikan kepada negara-negara di Afrika sub-Sahara. 
Kajian ini memperluaskan model yuran audit dengan menyiasat kesan kepelbagaian 
etnik ahli lembaga pengarah, pengarah asing dan dua jawatankuasa kecil (iaitu 
Jawatankuasa-jawatankuaas Pengurusan Risiko dan korporat) yang diperkenalkan 
pada tahun 2011 dalam kod tadbir urus korporat di Nigeria pada harga audit. Data 
untuk kajian ini dikumpul melalui sumber sekunder di dalam bentuk laporan tahunan 
(pemerhatian = 124) daripada 23 sektor ekonomi Nigeria. Hipotesis yang telah diuji 
menggunakan analisis data panel. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahawa pengarah asing, 
jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko dan jawatankuasa tadbir urus korporat mempunyai 
kesan positif dan signifikan dengan harga audit. Walau bagaimanapun kepelbagaian 
etnik ahli lembaga pengarah adalah tidak signifikan. Penemuan menyokong kedua-
dua teori agensi dan teori sumber pergantungan. Implikasi dasar penemuan ini adalah 
bahawasanya kelemahan mekanisma urus tadbir korporat dan pemilikan struktur juga 
mempengaruhi harga audit. Oleh itu, kualiti audit terjejas. Ini memerlukan keperluan 
untuk pembuat dasar kepada dasar-dasar yang diumumkan yang akan diuruskan 
untuk mengaudit harga di negara ini. 
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1.1 Background to the Study  
The divorce of ownership from management highlights the need for a high quality
1
 audit. 
Since managers are bound to behave in way contrary to equity holder’s interest (i.e. 
agency problem) stemming from information asymmetry between management and the 
stakeholders (Jesen & Meckling, 1976).The nature of the agency problem faced by 
individual firm is closely linked with its ownership structure (Sullivan, 2000). For 
instance, in the USA and UK ownership is disperse, though with strong investor’s 
protection, the manager tends to behave in an opportunistic manner that put the 
shareholders at risk of losing return on their investment and in extreme cases the whole 
investment (La Porta, Lopezae-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). However in concentrated 
ownership structure (predominant in developing countries), the problem created is that of 
wealth expropriation between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders 
exacerbated by weak investors’ protection (La Porta et al.  1999).  
Accordingly, to mitigate the agency problem ensuing from ownership structure, 
researchers, for example Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), posit that managerial ownership, 
concentrated ownership by both institutional and blockholder serves as an effective 
monitoring mechanisms that improve firm’s performance. In addition, the role of the 
various internal and external corporate governance mechanism cannot be disregarded, 
because it reconcile, the conflicting interest of stakeholders (Charsen, Robu, Carp & 
                                                          
1
 Using market based approach Deangelo (1981), as the possibility that an auditor discover and 
disclose a breach in the client accounting system. 
The contents of 
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